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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIA-
TION and George Ingalls, d/b/a 
George's Market, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents, 
vs. 
JAMES L. BUSH, d/b/a BUSH SUPER 
MARKET, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 7783 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
An acton was brought by the Trade Commission of Utah 
against James L. Bush, d/b/a Bush Super Market in Ogden, 
Utah for violating the Unfair Practices Act of the State of 
Utah. It was the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant 
violated the Unfair Practices Act and more particularly Sec-
tion 16A-4-7, as amended by Chapter 21, Laws of 1951, by 
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selling merchandise below cost, as that term is defined in the 
statute, by issuing S & H green stamps with the sale of mer-
chandise marked up no more than the minimum prescribed by 
the statute. The facts in the case are not disputed. It is agreed 
that the defendant sold many items which will hereafter be 
referred to as 67o items on which the markup was the bare 
statutory minimum of 670 . The defendant does not deny doing 
the acts complained of but maintains that such acts do not con-
stitute a violation of the statute. 
The evidence was heard by the trial court and after oral 
argument and written memoranda had been considered by the 
court, judgment was rendered against the defendant for having 
violated the statute and an injunction was issued restraining 
the defendant from continuing the unlawful practices. De-
fendant thereafter prosecuted this appeal. 
The particular facts of the case will be more thoroughly 
discussed in connection with the points. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE ISSUANCE OF CASH DISCOUNT STAMPS 
IS NOT COMPARABLE TO THE COST OF ADVERTISING, 
THE COST OF CARRYING CHARGE ACCOUNTS, THE 
COST OF MAKING DELIVERIES, ETC. 
II. THE GIVING OF A TRADING STAMP IS IN EF-
FECT A CASH DISCOUNT WHICH REDUCES THE PUR-
CHASE PRICE OF THE ARTICLE PURCHASED. 
4 
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III. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A DEFINITE 
INTENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO 
INJURE COMPETITORS. 
IV. THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS CONSTITU-
TIONAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUANCE OF CASH DISCOUNT STAMPS IS 
NOT COMPARABLE TO THE COST OF ADVERTISING, 
THE COST OF CARRYING CHARGE ACCOUNTS, THE 
COST OF MAKING DELIVERIES, ETC. 
Appellant devotes pages 12 to 29 of his brief to the 
proposition that the issuance of cash discount stamps is com-
parable to the cost of advertising, the cost of carrying charge 
accounts, the cost of making deliveries, etc., and that the 
giving of such stamps constitutes a cash discount. With the 
later position respondents are in agreement. 
The argument that the issuance of cash discount stamps 
is comparable to the cost of advertising, the cost of carrying 
credit and the cost of other functions performed by some retail 
grocers has been rejected by various courts which have con-
sidered the matter. The question was thoroughly considered 
by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York in the 
case of Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, et al, 302 New York 61, 
96 NE 2d 177. In that case the New York Court said: 
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Considered as a method of advertising, the challeng-
ed scheme must be differentiated from types of service 
such as free parking, self-service, care of infants, enter-
tainment, free delivery and the like, with which we are 
not presently concerned. These other types of service 
have no direct relation to the article purchased or the 
price paid. They are completely separated and too re-
mote from the pricing element to come within the 
statute's prohibition. Here the benefit to the customer 
is directly, proportionately, inseparably and specifically 
related to the article purchased and its price. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The vast distinction between the giving of trading stamps 
and mere advertising was also considered by the Supreme 
Court of the United Stats in the case of Rast v. Van Deman 
& Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 S. Ct. 3 70, 60 L.Ed. 679, wherein 
the court said: 
It would be an endless task to cite cases in demon-
stration, and that the supplementing of the sale of 
one article by a token given and to be redeemed in some 
other article has accompaniments and effects beyond 
mere advertising the allegations of the bill and the 
argument of counsel establish. Advertising is merely 
identification and description, apprising of quality and 
place. It has no other object than to draw attention to 
the article to be sold, and the acquisition of the article 
to be sold constitutes the only inducement to its pur-
chase. The matter is simple, single in purpose and 
motive; its consequences are well defined, there being 
nothing ulterior; it is the practice of old and familiar 
transactions and has sufficed for their success. 
The schemes of complainants have no such direct-
ness and· effect. They rely upon something else than 
the article sold. They tempt by a promise of a value 
6 
an 
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greater than that article and apparently not represent-
ed in its price, and it hence may be thought that thus 
by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence. 
See also Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 LEd 
691. 
POINT II 
THE GIVING OF A TRADING STAMP IS IN EFFECT 
A CASH DISCOUNT WHCH REDUCES THE PURCHASE 
PRICE OF THE ARTICLE PURCHASED. 
Appellant concedes that the effect of g1vmg a trading 
stamp is to grant a cash discount to the purchaser but then 
paradoxically maintains that such discount does not affect 
a reduction in the price of the article. The evidence in this 
case shows that with each article purchased appellant gave 
an S & H green stamp for each lOc represented in the pur-
chase price which was redeemable either in merchandise or 
cash. If redeemed in merchandise it represented a discount 
on the article purchased of slightlr more than 2lfo. If redeemed 
in cash it represented a discount of slightly less than 2<fo. 
The net effect was no different than if appellant had handed 
back in cash or reduced the selling price of the article by an 
amount equal to the redeemable value of the stamp. If a cash 
discount (effectuated by the giving of a trading stamp) does 
not result in a lowered price on the article purchased then a 
discount ach1ally given in cash would not result in a lowered 
price. Under appellant's argument the cash discounts, which 
the evidence shows were offered by Simpson's Market, Safeway 
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and American Food Stores in the amount of Yfo, would be 
perfectly legal. If appellant's position is correct it would 
follow that if another grocery store were to give a cash dis-
count of 6Cf0 , that also would be legal. The provision of the 
Unfair Practices Act prohibiting sales below cost then would 
be completely nullified. A grocer could mark up an item 
enough to comply with the statute, then completely nullify it 
by lowering the price of the article again by means of a cash 
discount. It is a primary rule of statutory construction that 
courts will construe statutes to have some meaning. If the 
construction contended for by appellant were adopted by the 
Court, the prohibition against sales below cost would be abso-
lutely meaningless. Merely by adopting the device of a cash 
discount any merchant that desired to do so could completely 
circumvent the enitre effect of the statute. This contention 
was dealt with by the Court of Appeals of New York in the 
Picker case cited above. The Picker case was concerned not 
with an Unfair Trades Practices Act but with a Fair Trades 
Practices Act. While the Picker case was concerned with "fair 
trade prices" rather than "sales below cost," it is in point 
so far as the basic principles are concerned. In the Picker 
case, rather than to give coupons, various merchants in the (oun 
town had teamed together in a pool and had given their cus- (o. 1 
tomers the receipts from their cash registers. The customers Iner
1 
would take the receipts and treat them just as S & H green 
stamps are treated. When a customer had secured a sufficient 
number of the receipts he could redeem them at a central 
office either for cash or for merchandise. The situation was 
analgous to the case here under consideration. 
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In discussing the nature of the cash discount afforded by 
the receipt system, the New York Court stated: 
"Assuming that there is no essential difference be-
tween the use of trading stamps and cash register re-
ceipts which are redeemable, and that either may be 
regarded as a form of cash discount, I nevertheless 
cannot agree with the opinion in the cases cited that 
such a discount does not cut the sale price of an article. 
No matter how one puts it, the consumer who is accord-
ed a cash discount in reality pays that much less for 
the article which he purchases, and this is none the less 
true because the return is by way of merchandise 
rather than coin which may purchase merchandise. 
When defendants sold plaintiff's products at fair trade 
prices, and as a part of the same transaction gave 
their ·customers cash register receipts having a redem-
tion value of 21f27o of such fair trade prices, they, in 
effect, sold plaintiff's products at 2lf27o less than the 
prices fixed. I can s_ee no distinction between returning 
to the customer a credit memorandum of 21f27o and 
giving him a cash register receipt. And whether the 
discount is small or large makes no difference-the 
statute forbids both." 
This same matter was also considered by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Wisconsin in the case of Ed Schuster & 
Co. v. Steffes, 23·7 Wis. 41, 295 NW 737, 133 ALR 1071. 
There the Wisconsin Court stated; 
"The contention that trading stamps are merely a 
species of cash discount has substance and perhaps is 
true. It does not follow, however, that so considered th~ 
issuance of stamps does not effect a reduction of the 
stipulated resale price, and the fact is that it does result 
in such a reduction. This is obvious in all cash trans-
actions and only slightly less so than in those involving 
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credit. Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred in 
holding that to the extent of a two per cent discount 
trading stamps do not operate to reduce the resale price 
and are not within the prohibition of the subsection." 
l 
It is true that there are two cases decided under the Fair 
Trade Act which hold that the giving of a trading stamp or 
a cash discount coupon does not .r.esult in lowermg the fixed 
price under the interpretation of the Fair Trade Act. Those l 1 
cases as cited by appellant in his brief are Bristol-Meyers v. 
Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 and Weco Products v. 
Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P. 
2d 856. However, those decisions were reached on the basis, 
as stated in the Picker case that, "the allowance of such dis-
count has not injured the good will value of any article of 
plaintiff's merchandise." The difference in effect of giving a 
cash discount with articles protected by the Fair Trade Act 
and with articles protected by the Unfair PFactices Act is 
clear. Generally, the purpose of the Fair Trade Act is to insure : l 
the manufacturers of brand name articles that the reputation 
of their products will not be jeopardized by being sold in some 
stores at lower prices than those established by the manu-
facturers and likewise to insure that the public will be able 
to buy a brand name article at a given price throughout 
the country. Both the California and Pennsylvania cases were 
brought by the manufacturers on the grounds that by giving 
the trading stamps with the purchase of the brand name article, 
the reputation of the particular brand was being jeopardized 
in the public mind and that the public would come to regard 
the brand name in question as a cheaper article or an article 
of inferior quality. The rationale of the courts is obvious. So 
10 
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long as a certain stated l?osted price was maintained by the 
merchants on the particular articles being sold, this would 
be the price which the public would regard as tlie established 
price by the manufacturer and purchasers would clearly under-
stand that any reduction that they got from that established 
price did not represent a concession made by the manufacturer 
but was purely an arrangement between them and their local 
merchant. As is pointed out in the Picker case, this reasoning 
is rather tenuous even in regard to the Fair Trade Act, and 
of course would have no bearing as applied to the Unfair 
Practices Act. While it may be argued as is done in the Cali-
fornia and the Pennsylvania cases, that the giving of trading 
stamps does not effect a violation of the spirit and intent of the 
Fair Trades Act, it is quite clear that the giving of trading 
stamps as pointed out above completely nullifies the Unfair 
Trade Practices Act. 
The use of trading stamps was challenged under the 
Unfair Practices Act in the California case of Food and 
Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P. 2d 
3 supra. There plaintiff did not charge that there was any 
sale below cost but contended rather that the giving of the 
stamps was, in effect, the giving of a commodity in violation 
of a section of the Unfair Practices Act. The defendant has 
quoted this case in his brief to the effect that the trading 
stamp was not a commodity but was a cash discount. How-
ever, we direct the court's attention to language in the deci-
sion where the California court states that had the action been 
brought under the below cost section of the statute and had 
the evidence been proper, an injunction would have been 
granted. The California court said: 
11 
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"Concededly, the Unfair Practices Act, supra, makes 
no reference to trading stamps. To support the re-
spondent's position, therefore, it is necessary for him 
to show either that the plan conducted by the appellant 
amounts to the giving away of a product for the pur-
pose of injuring competitors or destroying competition, 
or that by its use he sells products below cost. But the 
association does not assert that the appellant's issuance 
of trading stamps resulted in the sale of any com-
modities below cost, and the affidavits filed by it do 
not include any facts indicating that sales below cost 
were accomplished by the use of stamps." (Emphasis 
added.) 
While the above language of the court is dicta it cer-
tainly indicates that the California Court felt that had the 
action been brought under the proper section of the act and 
had it appeared from the evidence that the giving of the 
stamps reduced the price blow the required 67o markup, a 
violation of the statute would have been proved. 
Appellant takes the position that the holding of the Cali-
fornia court in the Garfield case is altered by the holding in 
the Weco case cited above. However, as pointed out above, 
this is not so for the reason that the Weco case concerns itself 
with the Fair Trades Practices Act whereas the Garfield case 
concerns itself with the Unfair Practices Act just as does the 
case now before the Court and the two Acts have an entirely 
different purpose and view. 
In the case of Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, 79 A.2d 
603, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the defendant 
violated the Fair Trade Act by issuing trading stamps with the 
sale of fair trade items thus reducing the price of those items. 
The Court said: 
12 
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"It is true that the giving of trading stamps and 
cash register receipts redeemable either in _merchandise 
or cash by purchasers have been held to be price cutting 
within the meaning of the Fair Trade Acts and, as 
such, en joinable. Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 23 7 Wis. 
41, 295 NW 7?,7, 133 A.L.R. 1071; Bristol-Meyers 
Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177. But, other 
services furnished by a retailer to attract customers to 
his business such as the furnishing of parking facilities, 
baby sitting, delivery service and the extension of credit, 
are not held to be price cutting within the meaning of 
- Fair Trade Acts. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 
336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 Weco Products Co. v. Mid-
City Cut-Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 
P.2d 856." 
In the Oregon case of Lambert Pharmacal Company v. 
Roberts Bros., 233 P. 2d 258, the right of a merchant to give 
trading stamps with a fair traded item was challenged. After 
the case was originally argued, the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers 
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, decided 
that the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act, which in general excepted state fair trade laws 
and unfair trade practice acts from the prohibitions of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was not sufficiently broad to extend 
this exemption to a non-signer of a fair trade agreement. In 
view of the fact that a non-signer was involved in the Oregon 
case, the Supreme Court of Oregon aJoked that the problem 
be reargued and after reargument held that in view of the 
fact that a non-signer was involved, the Schwegmann case 
prevented it from upholding the Fair Trade Act of Oregon 
as to a non-signer. However, the very fact tha.t the Court 
asked for a reargument of the case intimates that had it not 
13 
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been for the Schwegmann case the court would have held that 
the giving of the trading stamps effectuated a reduction of 
the price of the article. Otherwise there would have been no 
reason for asking for the reargument. As pointed out above, 
there is much greater reason for prohibiting the use of trading 
stamps to effectuate price cutting under the Unfair Practices 
Act than there is under the Fair Trade Act. 
The argument of defendant that even if a reduction in 
price below the statutory minimum was effected by the giving 
of· trading stamps, the reduction is so small that the rule of 
de minimus should apply is rather novel in view of the testi-
mony of the defendant himself. While the cash discount 
effected by the giving of the trading stamps amounts to 2.08<_f0 
so far as the customer is concerned, it should be remembered 
that the mark-up on these articles under which the complaint 
is made was only 6lfo. Therefore, the reduction of 2.08<,fo 
means that the margin of the retailer, upon which he has to 
do business, was reduced more than one-third. Certainly such 
a reduction does not come under the de minimum rule. Fur-
thermore, regardless of how small the value may be to the 
consumer of a single trading stamp or a group of trading 
stamps, it is evident that the trading stamps are effecting a 
definite injury to competitors. If they are not, and if they 
are not drawing additional business to the retailer that uses 
them then obviously the claims of the S & H Green Stamp 
Company that they stimulate business are not well founded. 
The defendant himself testified that since using the stamps 
he had drawn new business, not only from his immediate 
neighborhood, but from all over the city, that his business had 
increased substantially and that he felt that the existence of 
14 
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the S & H Green Stamp Plan in his store contributed in a 
material way to this increased business, which of course, was 
drawn from his competitors. How then can it be argued that 
the rule of de minimum should apply? De minim us applies 
only when the matter under consideration is so small as to 
have no practical effect. Here, as we· have seen, the matter 
under consideration represents more than 1/3 of the retailer's 
total mark-up and has effectuated a substantial increase in 
the business of the retailer using the trading stamps. As the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York in the Picker case 
above cited stated: 
"I can· see no distinction between returning to the 
customer a credit memorandum of 2V27o and giving 
him a cash register receipt. And whether the· discount 
is small or large makes no difference--the statute for-
bids both. 
"Defendants her~ agree that if the customer pur-
chased $10.00 worth of plaintiff's products, he would 
immediately receive on request and for nothing, any 
fair traded article he desired and which was priced at 
25c. If a retailer may allow 2V:27o under the statute, 
a competitor may follow the same plan but instead 
allow 570 , in biting retaliation with an even greater 
allowance. Where may it end? The same cut-throat 
competition sought to be avoided by the Fair Trade 
Law could thus be revised under the so-called cash 
discount system." 
The appellants maintain that even if the giving of the 
stamps does result in a price reduction, they would not be 
guilty of a violation of the law under the facts complained of. 
They maintain that Section 16A-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943 requires that where there is a combination purchase 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of 6lfo items with other items having a much higher mark-up, 
the law is not violated unless the sales price of all the items 
taken collectively is below the collective cost of the items. Even 
if it be conceded that Section 16A-4-9 is ambiguous on its 
face, however, when read in light of the purpose of the entire 
Unfair Practices Act, its meaning becomes quite clear. Ob-
viously no retailer is going to be able to sell all of his products 
below cost and still stay in business. If he sells some items 
below cost, whether it be by means of a trading stamp, an 
out and out cash discount or merely a loss-leader, if he is 
going to make a profit on his whole operation it is necessary 
that he mark some items up more than enough to represent 
a fair return on such items. This is the very practice at 
which the statute is aimed. The statute is designed to 
prevent retailers from giving the customer an apparent 
saving on certain items in order to lure him into the 
store where it is hoped that the customer will purchase 
other items on which the markup is out of line. The 
section mentioned obviously means that each item or every 
item in the purchase must bear its own share of the cost of 
doing business and not that the collective profit on all the 
items should be enough to cover the cost of doing business. 
The natural law of economics will take care of that matter 
and no statute would be required. 
Appellant takes the position that because Section 16A-4-7, 
subsection 2, provides that in figuring his costs the grocer is 
not allowed to deduct cash discounts, it follows as a matter 
of logic that cash discounts should not be construed as re-
ducing the purchase price paid by the ultimate consumer 
to the grocer. We are unable to follow the logic of the appel-
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lant' s pos1t1on m this regard. The Legislature has seen fit 
to make a specific exception in the case of cost to the whole-
saler and cost to the retailer. If, as a matter of sound logic, 
cash discounts would not reduce the purchase price, why, 
then, would a specific statutory provision be required ? The 
rule of expressio unius, exclusio alterius would seem to apply 
in this case. The Legislature has chosen to except from the 
ordinary logical meaning of the term "cash discount," its 
application to the purchase price of the wholesaler and 
the retailer. It has not seen fit to make such a specific ex-
ception as to the purchase price of the ultimate consumer. 
The only conclusion to be drawn from this, therefore, is that 
the Legislature intended that the ordinary commonly accepted 
rules of construction should apply. Furthermore, to provide 
that cash discounts shall not be construed as reducing the price 
of goods to the wholesaler and the retailer does not strike 
at the very foundation of the Act, whereas if a similar pro-
vision were made in regard to the price paid by the ultimate 
consumer, as has been pointed out above, the entire Act 
prohibiting sales below cost would be rendered inoperative. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A DEFINITE INTENT 
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO INJURE 
COMPETITORS. 
The Utah Unfair Practices Act provides that the acts, in 
order to be in violation, must be done with the intent or the 
effect of injuring competitors. Later in the discussion of the 
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constitutional issues, we will discuss more fully the question 
of the constitutionality of a statute so providing and also the 
question of whether a state may constitutionally prohibit acts 
which have the effect of injuring competitors where no intent 
is shown. 
It appears quite clear, however, from the evidence in 
the case that the plaintiffs have established both the effect and 
the intent. Numerous grocer witnesses called by the plaintiffs 
testified that in their opinion the issuance of stamps by the 
defendant had taken business from other business establish-
ments in the nieghborhood. The witness W angsguard testified 
as to how his business had fallen off since the stamps were 
issued and testified that in his opinion the direct cause of 
his business falling off was the issuance of the stamps by the 
defendant. The witness Van W aggonen testified that his 
· business had fallen off so much that its very existence was 
threatened. He further testified that he had seen customers 
who had formerly traded at his store going to the Bush Market. 
He further testified that many of his customers had asked 
him to put in the trading stamp system and complained because 
he did not do so. He further testified that in his opinion the 
issuance of the stamps by the defendant was responsible 
for the reduction in his business. 
Other witnesses representing the larger grocery stores 
throughout Ogden testified that the disastrous price war in 
the city of Ogden was traceable directly to the issuance of 
trading stamps at the Bush Markets. Bush himself, both in 
his deposition and during his examination on the stand, testi-
fied that his business had been materially increased since the 
18 
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issuance of these trading stamps, and further that in his opinion 
the stamps were a material factor in his business increas~. 
Therefore the effect of injury to competitors is well established. 
Obviously one type of injury to competitors which the Legis-
lature intended to prohibit by the passage of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act, in addition to protecting the public was the taking 
of a competitor's business by unfair means. If business is 
taken away by a competitor by fair methods of competition, 
that is legal and, of course, in keeping with the American 
tradition of free enterprise. However, the Legislature deter-
mined that certain methods of taking a competitor's business 
were unfair and unhealthy to business as a whole and pro-
hibited them. One of the unfair methods prohibited was the 
practice of price cutting as defined in the statute. The sole 
question of intent, therefore, is not whether the defendant 
intended to violate the law, but merely whether the method 
which h adopted, leaving aside for the moment the question 
of whether or not it is legal, was adopted by him with the 
intent of attracting customers from other stores. 
Intent, of course, is something which must almost always 
be proved by circumstantial evidence. It is seldom if ever 
that a person will admit on the witness stand, or even admit 
before witnesses, that he intended to violate the law, that he 
intended to drive his competitors out of business or even that 
he intended to injure his competitors. In order to arrive at 
the intent of an individual the court must look at what the 
individual did, what the result was, and at the facts surround-
ing the situation in an effort to determine what, in the light 
of common knowledge, was probably the intent of the indivi-
dual in doing the act complained of. Here the evidence is 
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clear that the defendant did reduce his prices by means of 
giving trading stamps and that the result of this reduction in 
prices was that he injured his competitors by taking -their 
business away from them. It is a fundamental rule of law 
that individuals are presumed to intend the natural and prob-
able consequence of acts performed by them. The question 
of intent to injure competitors by price cutting was carefully 
considered by the Supreme Court of California in the case of 
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, et al, 143 P2d 762. California 
has a statute providing that evidence of the sale below cost 
is presumptive evidence of a violation of the law. The Supreme 
Court of California in the case above cited determined that 
this statutory presumption was invalid and unconstitutional 
because of the fact that there were certain classifications of 
sales exempted from the act and there was no logical assump-
tion merely because the sales were made that they did not 
fall within one of the exemptions provided in the statute. 
However, after invalidating the statutory presumption, the 
court went on to hold that the fact that the defendant had 
intentionally cut prices which had resulted in injuring com-
petitors was presumptive evidence that there was an intent 
to injure competitors even though there was no presumption 
that the sales were not within one of the exempted classes. 
In discussing this question the Supreme Court of California 
said: 
"So far as the first question is concerned, the respond-
ent produced as the first witness the secretary of the 
Retail Grocers Association of Alameda County. He 
testified that appellants attract customers of their 
competitors by selling at cost or below, and that the 
natural effect of selling below cost by one merchant 
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is to lessen the business of his competitors. Various 
grocery store operators then testified that they were 
competitors of appellants. Several of those operated 
stores reasonably close to that of appellants, one operat-
ed a store in Piedmont, and the others operated stores 
several miles distant. They all testified that during 
the early months of 1940 they noticed a material de-
cline in their volume of business that was not purely 
seasonal. Several of them testified that during this 
period they noticed a particular decline in the volume 
of their coffee sales, that being one of the products 
appellants admittedly sold below cost during this 
period. Several testified that in self -defense they had 
to reduce their price to meet the challenge of appel-
lants. Appellants argued that evidence of loss of volume 
is not necessarily evidence of "injury" to competitors 
because to constitute an in jury there must be a loss of 
profits, and loss of volume does not necessarily show 
loss of profits. There is ample evidence in the record 
of the highly competitive nature of the retail grocery 
business, and of the small margin of profit that exists 
because of such competition. In view of that evidence, 
it is a reasonable, if not inevitable, inference that loss 
of volume of business shows loss of profits. 
On this evidence the trial court found that these 
sales below cost were with the intent to injure com-
petitors or to destroy competition. It is, of course, 
true that all sales below cost are not prohibited. Only 
those sales accompanied by the requisite intent are 
prohibited. This was the express holding in Wholesale 
T. Dealers v. National, etc., Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, at 
page 658, 82 P2d at page 17, 118 A.L.R. 486. See 
also, Balzar v. Coler, 11 Cal. 2d 633, 82 P2d 19. In~ent, 
however, is not something that can alwzays be proved 
by concrete evidence. It is an intangible matter that 
may be proved by inferences based on reasonable 
probabilities. Without now considering the evidence 
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produced by appellants, and without regard to the 
presumption contained in paragraph 5 above quoted, 
we think that it is a reasonable inference from the above 
evidence that the sales here involved were with the 
requisite intent. The sales below cost are admitted. 
The evidence shows competitors were injured by such 
price cutting by appellants. In addition, the act per-
mits sales below cost, but the respondent, proved that 
these sales did not fall within any of the permitted 
categories. This is a necessary part of the respondent's 
burden of proof. Green v. Grimes-Stassforth S. Co. 
39 Cal. App. 2d 52, 102 P2d 452. It seems to us that 
when sales below cost are shown, when injury to com-
petitors appears, and when the evidence shows the 
sales were not in any of the permitted classes, the 
trier of the fact may reasonably infer, as was done in 
this case, that such sales were of the prohibited class, 
that is, sales below cost for the purpose or with the 
intent to injure competitors or to destroy competition. 
In the case now before the court, as in the case above 
cited, the fact of price cutting has been proved. The injury 
to competitors has been proved. It his been stipulated by the 
parties that the acts complained of did not fall within any 
of the statutory exemptions except possibly subsection (d) 
relating to the reduction of prices to meet competition. The 
defendant introduced no evidence to indicate that the price 
cutting was to meet competition and on this he had the burden 
of proof. Plaintiff, however, went ahead and assumed the 
burden of affirmatively proving that there was no price-
cutting which might have caused defendant to reduce his 
prices to meet competition in the Ogden area in the period 
preceding the issuance of the trading stamps by the defendant. 
Therefore, with the statutory exemptions negatived, the only 
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question left is the question of intent. As is stated in the 
quotation above by the California court this intent can be 
presumed. However, we need not rely on this presumption. 
During the cross-examination of the defendant on the stand, 
he admitted, somewhat reluctantly, that his_ purpose in giving 
S & H green stamps was to attract new business for his store; 
that it was immaterial where the business came from; that 
if it was business that formerly belonged to a competitor that 
was quite all right. As is pointed out above, while it was 
legitimate for him to attract new customers by fair methods 
of competition, the Unlawful Practices Act of Utah prohibits 
the attracting of such customers by means which have been 
declared unfair by the Legislature. 
POINT IV 
THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant attacks the constitutionality of the Unfair 
Practices Act on the ground that it purportedly violates the 
"equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the Federal 
Constitution and the corresponding sections of the State Con-
stitution. 
It is alleged that the statute discriminates between the 
"credit and delivery" and the "cash and carry" merchant. The 
alleged discrimination, however, is based on appellant's 
erroneous assumption that the statutory markup is intended 
to cover all of the costs of the one but only some of the costs 
of the other. A complete and decisive answer to this attack 
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on the constitutionality of the statute is a reading of the 
statute itself where "cost" is defined as including, among other 
elements, a markup of six per cent to cover a proportionate 
part of the cost of doing business in the absence of proof 
of a lesser cost. There is nothing in the statute which either 
expressly or inferentially provides that the statutory markup 
is to be applied differently in the case of a "credit and de-
livery" or a "cash and carry" merchant. Section 16A-4-7 (b) 3·, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 21, 
Laws of 1951, provides in part as follows: 
When used in this act, the term "cost to the retailer" 
shall mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the 
retailer within thirty days prior to the date of sale, 
or the date of offering for sale, or the replacement 
cost of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever is 
lower less all trade discounts except customary dis-
counts for cash; to which shall be added * * * (c) a 
markup to cover a proportionate part of the cost of 
doing busines, which markup, in the absence of proof 
of a lesser cost, shall be six per cent * * * * . 
Appellant's erroneous assumption that the statute contem-
plates a different application of the statutory markup in the 
case of the two types of merchants interjects a discriminatory 
element into the case which does not in fact exist. 
As a corollary to the foregoing, appellant asserts that the 
overhead of the "cash and carry" merchant is lower than the 
overhead of the "credit and delivery" merchant and that con-
sequently the "cash and carry" merchant should be permitted 
to charge correspondingly lower prices. Assuming, arguendo, 
that appellant's assumption is correct, it would follow that 
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the "cash and carry .. merchant could charge lower prices than 
the "credit and delivery" merchant providing that both mer-
chants priced their merchandise at actual rather than statutory 
cost. It does not follow, however, that the "cash and carry" 
merchant or the "credit and delivery" merchant may price 
his merchandise on the basis of the statutory markup and then 
deduct therefrom a particular item of expense merely because 
he does not and the other type of merchant does incur that 
item of expense as a part of his cost of doing business. Under 
the statute, a merchant may sell his merchandise either at 
actual cost, which necessarily includes all costs of doing busi-
ness, or at stautory cost, which, by its very definition, includes 
only a proportionate part of the cost of doing business. In 
other words either the "cash and carry" or the "credit and 
delivery" merchant may sell at actual or statutory cost but 
neither may price his merchandise at statutory cost and then 
deduct from the selling price an item of expense in the cost 
of doing business which he does not bear but which is borne 
by the other type of merchant. 
Appellant cites Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board 
v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380; Serrer v. 
Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 NE 2d 91; and, Cohen 
v. Frey & Sons, Inc.~ ____ MD. ____ , 80 A2d 267 to support 
his assertion that the Utah statute is unconstitutional because 
it purportedly fails to recognize cost differentials between the 
"cost and carry" and the "credit and delivery" types of busi-
nesses. The cited cases are not in point here, however, because 
in each of those cases the courts were dealing with the defi-
nition of cost to the wholesaler rather than cost to the re-
tailer. Furthermore, in Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry 
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Board v. Everglades Laundry, supra, the court was dealing 
with a schedule of prices fixed by a board rather than a markup 
prescribed by statute. Moreover, while the Supreme Court 
of Ohio made no reference to the definition of cost to the 
retailer in its opinion in the Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co. 
case, supra, the Court of Common Pleas (74 NE 2d 841), 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, did approve the 
definition of cost to the retailer contained in the Ohio statute 
when it said: 
* * * * It may not be inappropriate to remark that 
unlike the definition of "cost to the wholesaler" the 
statutory presumptive markup does not cover a re-
tailer's cost except in cases where the actual cost of 
doing business is undeterminable or equal to 670 . In 
all other cases a retailer's markup corresponds to the 
actual cost ·of doing business whether it be higher or 
less than the presumptive 6%. 
A further distinguishing feature referred to by the court in 
striking down the statute in the Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 
case, supra, was the statutory presumption of guilt which is 
not present in the Utah statute. On the other hand, numerous 
courts have upheld the constitutionality of such statutes where 
the definition of cost contained therein was remarkably 
similar to the definition of cost contained in the Utah statute. 
See People v. Gordon et al., 105 Cal App 2d 711, 234 P2d 287; 
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, et al, 25 Cal 2d 108, 153 
P2d 9; May's Drug Stores v. State Tax Commission, ____ Iowa 
____ , 45 NW2d 245; Old Homestead Bread Co. et al v. Marx 
Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P2d 1007; State ex rel An-
derson, County Attorney, v. Commercial Candy Co. Inc., et 
al., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P2d 1034; Kentucky Utilities Co. v. 
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Carlisle Ice Co., 279 Ky. 585, 131 SW 2d 499; Louisiana 
Wholesaler Distributors Ass'n. v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1, 
36 So. 2d 403; McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 NW 
414; Hill et al. v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 NW2d 594; Mc-
Intire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A2d 471; Adwon v. 
Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n. Inc., 204 Okla. 199, 228 
P 2d 376; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113· SW2d 733; 
State v. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P2d 337; State v. Twentieth 
Century Markets, 236 Wis. 215, 294 NW 873; and State v. 
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P2d 767. 
Appellant's assertion that if the Utah statute is construed 
to prohibit only S & H cash discount stamps, it is unconsti-
tutional because it discriminates against a legitimate business, 
is another specious attempt to mislead and confuse the court. 
The Utah statute does not prohibit the use of S & H cash 
discount stamps. The Utah statute only prohibits -their use 
for an unlawful purpose. It prohibits their issuance with 
the sale of merchandise where the effect is to reduce the price 
of the merchandise below cost for the purpose of injuring 
competitors and destroying competition or where the effect 
thereof may be substantially to lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly. The prohibition of the statute is leveled 
not only at S & H cash discounts but cash discounts in any 
form when, and only when, the amount of the cash discount 
reduces the selling price of the merchandise below cost in 
violation of the statue. A merchant may issue cash discounts 
by means of S & H green stamps or any other means so long 
as the selling price of the merchandise is not thereby reduced 
below cost in violation of the statute. However, he may not 
do indirectly what the law prohibits him from doing directly. 
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Designating the issuance of S & H cash discounts or any 
other form of cash discounts something other than what they 
actually are does not clothe the practice with judicial protection 
if the practice contravenes the express provisions of a statute. 
As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals in the 
case of Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, et al, 302 New York 61, 
96 NE2d 177: 
* * * No matter how one puts it, the consumer 
who is accorded a cash discount in reality pays that 
much less for the article which he purchases, and this 
is none the less true because the return is by way of 
merchandise rat4er than coin which may purchase 
merchandise. * * * 
Appellant also challenges the validity of the Utah stattue 
if it is construed to permit conviction upon proof in the alter-
native of a wrongful intent or a harmful effect. The challenged 
section is Section 16A-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
amended by Chapter 21, Laws of 1951, which provides in 
part as follows: 
It shall be unlawful * * * to sell * * any article ~u 
* * * at less than the cost thereof * * * for the purpose 
of injuring competitors and destroying competition, 
or of misleading the public, or when the effect of sell-
ing * * * at less than cost * * * may be substantially 
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. * * * 
It is true that many statutes prohibiting sales below cost do 
require -a wrongful intent to injure competitors or destroy 
competition as an essential element of a violation. On the 
other hand, where the language of the statute does not expressly 
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require a wrongful intent as an essential element of the of-
fense, courts have, by judiical construction, read that element 
into the statute. Thus in Arizona v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 
Ariz. 308, 113 P2d 650, where the statute prohibited sales 
below cost "with the intent or effect" of injuring competitors 
or destroying competition the court said: 
We consider then the objection that the chapter im-
poses both civil and penal liability upon one who vio-
lates its provisions without any criminal intent. Upon 
a careful examination of section 3, supra, which states 
what constitutes a violation of the chapter, we think 
that while it is not explicitly stated therein that the 
particular thing done must be done with a criminal 
intent, the only reasonable implication from the entire 
language of the chapter is that such intent is an essen-
tial ingredient of a violation thereof. A similar con-
struction has been given to statutes which fail as does 
ours, explicitly to require the criminal intent. People 
v. Kahn, 19 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 758, 60 P.2d 596; 
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 S. Ct :323, 
62 L.Ed. 763. 
See also Hill et al v. Kusy,. 150 Neb. 653, 3·5 NW 2d 594; 
Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 SW 2d 733; Old Home-
stead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 3 75, 117 P. 
2d 1007; Acme Dstb. Co. v. Thoni, ____ Tenn. ____ 136 SW 
2d 734. 
In the case of Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 
13 A. 2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120, the court said: 
* * * if the Act confined itself to prohibiting sales 
below cost when intended to destroy competition, it 
would undoubtedly be valid, as has been held in various 
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jurisdictions where such acts have been enacted with 
that qualification. State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 SD 
136, 123 NW 504, 42 LRA (NS) 804, affirmed 226 
U.S. 157, 33 S Ct 66, 57 L.Ed 164; People v. Kahn, 
19 Cal App Supp (2d) 758, 60 P (2d) 596; Whole-
sale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy & 
Tobacco Co., 11 Cal (2d) 634, 82 P(2d) 3, 118 
ALR 486; State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P(2d) 
767; Associated Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont. 
5}0, 86 P(2d) 1031; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 
113 SW (2d) 733; Hammond v. Bayless Markets, 
Inc., Arizona Superior Ct., Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade 
& Ind. Serv. ( 2d ed) 96. 632. * * * 
The only case cited by appellant where a statute pro-
hibiting sales below cost was invalidated because it contained 
the words "or effect" after the phrase "with intent" as does 
the Utah statute is Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 
P 2d 538. In that case, certain trade practices were declared 
by one section of the statute to be in contravention of the 
public policy of the state and made a crime by another section 
of the statute. The statute was invalidated because the court 
held that to strike out any part of the section which declared 
the public policy worked a change of that policy so as to 
defeat the basis for declaring the prohibited trade practices a 
crime. The reasoning of the court in invalidating the Oklahoma 
statute would not be applicable in determining the consti-
tutionality of the Utah statute, however, because to strike 
out those words in the Utah statute would not work any change 
in the declared policy of the Utah statute. 
It is to be noted moreover that the Supreme Court of the 
United States as well as the highest courts of various states has 
upheld the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting the sell-
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ing of merchandise below a fixed price regardless of intent. 
In the case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940, 
54 S. Ct. 505, 89 ALR 1469, the applicable statute provided 
in part as follows: 
* * * it shall be unlawful for a milk dealer to sell 
or buy or offer to sell or buy milk at any price less or 
more than such price * * * (the price fixed by the 
board). (Emphasis added.) 
In upholding the validity of the statute the Supreme Court 
said: 
Legislation concerning sales of goods, and inci-
dentally affecting prices, has repeatedly been held valid. 
In this class fall laws forbidding unfair competition by 
the charging of lower prices in one locality than those 
exacted in another, by giving trade inducements to 
purchasers, and by other forms of price discrimination. 
The public policy with respect to free competition has 
engendered state and federal statutes prohibiting 
monopolies, which have been upheld. 
* * * * * 
* * * there can be no doubt that upon proper occa-
sion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate 
a business in any of its aspects, including the prices 
to be charged for the products or commodities it sells. 
In sustaining the validity of a Minnesota statute which 
prohibited sales below cost "for the purpose of or with the 
effect of" injuring competitors and destroying competition as 
not objectionable on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota, in the case of McElhone v. Gregor, 207 Minn. 
580, 292 NW 414, said: 
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The present statute prohibits sales at less than cost 
for the purpose or with the effect of injuring com-
petitors and destroying competition. Intent to injure 
is not essential to violation. This is not fatal to the act. 
Sales below cost which have the effect of injuring 
competition may be prohibited regardless of intent. 
(Emphasis added.) 
* * * * * 
The legislature is attempting to protect retailers 
and the public from unfair trade practices. It is not 
for us to deny its conclusions of fact that sales below 
cost are harmful and constitute a trade practice so 
unfair and injurious as to require legislative attention. 
The act declares and implements valid policy. We 
cannot say that the implementation bears no relation 
to the purpose. So, whatever its interference with 
plaintiff's freedom of contract, the statute transgresses 
no constitutional guaranty, unless in other respects 
it is arbitrary or unreasonable. The police power, 
which is about all the power that sovereign govern-
ment has, aside from its power of eminent domain and 
taxation, is not limited to protection of public health, 
., 
morals, and safety. It extends also to "economic ~! 
needs." Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 60 ll\N 
S. Ct. 792, 84 L.Ed.____ (opinion filed April 22, 1940). 
Therefore, it may protect from economic harm. 
The constitutionality of the Unfair Sales Act of the State !laru 
of New Hampshire making it a misdemeanor to sell below ~0w 
.cost "with intent or effect of injuring competitors" was also m~ 
upheld by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Mcintire ~n1 
v. Borofsky, 95 NH 174, 59 A2d 47. In that case the court said: I'll 
* * * Similar phraseology is found in several of 
the Unfair Sales Acts of the other states. 1 Callmann, 
Unfair Competition & Trade Marks ( 1945) Sec. 27, 
32 
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2 (a). It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the 
Legislature may declare an .tct criminal without requir-
ing that it be done with intent. State v. Cornish, 66 
N.H. 329, 21 A. 180, 11 L.R.A. 191; State v. Ryan, 
70 N.H. 196, 46 A. 49, 85 Am. St. Rep. 629; State v. 
Goonan, 89 N.H. 528, 3 A2d 105; State v. Yosua, 
91 N.H. 181, 16 A2d 370. In case of doubt the statute 
has frequently been construed to require intent ( Coutre-
marsh v. Metcalf, 87 N.H. 127, 175 A. 173), but it is 
clear that the present statute by its exp~ess terms re-
quires either the intent or the effect of injuring or 
destroying competition. The Legislature deemed it 
necessary to do more than condemn a state of mind 
and provided that sales below cost, except as provided 
in Sec. 3, are an economic evil whether they are intended 
or have the effect of injuring competition. Such a 
statute is valid. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 
292 N.W. 414; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 
S.W. 2d 733. Cf Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal 
Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 65 S. Ct. 961, 89 
L. Ed. 1320; State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 
26 N.W. 2d 647. (Emphasis added.) 
See also Mays Drug Stores v. State Tax Commission, Iowa, 
45 NW 2d 245. 
Appellant also attempt to establish invalidity of the Utah 
statute by comparing it with other statutes which were struck 
down because in defining "cost" they were held to ~e so vague 
and indefinite that the retail merchant was unable to ascertain 
when he was violating the law. A careful analysis of the 
statutes which were invalidated for that reason, however, 
shows that those statutes were entirely different from the Utah 
statute. State v. Packard Bamberger Co., 123 N.J.L. 202, 8 
A2d 291; Comonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13· A2d 67, 
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128 ALR 1120; State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 
113 P2d 650; and, Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore 
Candy & T. Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A2d 201, cited by appellant, 
are not in point because in each of those cases the definition 
of cost was linked to such phrases as "prevailing market con-
ditions," "existing market conditions" or the "most favorable 
market prices available." None of those phrases are present 
in the applicable section of the Utah statute. In the case of 
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, the 
court struck down a Minnesota statute because it required 
a merchant making purchases from a manufacturer who pub-
lished a list price to use the list price as his cost regardless 
of whether or not it represented the merchant's actual cost. 
There is no such arbitrary requirement in the Utah statute. 
Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Everglades 
Laundry, 13 7 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380, is not in point because 
it dealt with cost to the wholesaler rather. than cost to the 
retailer and also with a schedules of prices fixed by a board 
rather than a statutory markup prescribed by the Legislature. 
The case of Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 A2d (Md. 1951), 
cited by appellant, cannot even be persuasive authority for 
invalidating the Utah statute because in the Maryland statute 
there was a presumption of guilt provision not present in the 
Utah statute and also because the trial court there rejected 
an attempt on the part of the defendant to establish a lesser 
cost. The Utah statute expressly authorizes a lesser cost where 
it can be established in lieu of the statutory markup. 
Finally, appellant attempts to avoid the real issue involved 
in this dispute, which is whether he violated the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act, by making the assertion that the Retail Grocers' 
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'~ Association was guilty of pnce fixing m violation of the 
' Sherman Act. 
The record shows conclusively that this was not an action 
commenced by the Retail Grocers' Association but an action 
commenced by the Trade Commission of Utah to enjoin the 
appellant herein from violating the provisions of the Utah 
Unfair Practices Act and in which action the Retail Grocers·· 
Association intervened upon stipulation of both parties. (Em-
phasis added.) Enforcement of the provisions of the Utah 
Unfair Practices Act is a duty enjoined by law upon the Trade 
Commission of Utah. Section 16A-2-13, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, provides: 
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall 
have full power, jurisdiction and authority: 
( 1) To prescribe rules and regulations not in con-
flict with the constitution and laws of this state for 
its own government and the transaction of its business. 
(2) To have and exercise general supervision over 
the administration of chapters 20 and 21, Laws of 
Utah, 19J. 7, as amended. 
( 3) To collect, collate, and publish statistical and 
other information relating to trade and business that 
is material to the enforcement of this act. 
( 4) To cooperate with and assist any trade or in-
dustry desiring to effectuate an agreement between its 
members for the purpose of stabilizing employment 
in the trade or industry and correcting unfair prac-
tices between competitors. 
( 5) To have and exercise general supervision over 
the administration and enforcement of Senate Bill No. 
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42, twenty-sixth legislature of the state of Utah, known 
as the barbers price and hour act. 
The Unfair Practices Act of the State of Utah is Chapter 21, 
Laws of Utah, 1937, as amended, referred to in subsection (2) 
quoted above. 
Appellant himself concedes that the Utah Unfair Prac-
tices Act is not a price fixing statute. At page 13 of his brief he 
states: 
Like the California Unfair Practices Act, upon which 
it is modeled, the Utah Unfair Practices Act is not a 
price fixing statute. 
Again at page 75 he states: 
In the case at bar, we think it is not only plain that 
the Utah Act, like. its California prototype, was not 
intended to sanction price fixing but we now have the 
benefit of Schewegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341 
U.S. 384, 386, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, (May 21, 
1951), where the Supreme Court noted that the Sher-
man Act makes it unlawful for individuals to enter 
into any agreement, express or implied limiting or fix-
ing prices, such price fixing being unlawful per se * * . 
In citing the case of Food and Grocery Bureau v. United 
States, 139 F. 2d 973, (C.C.A. 9th 1943) appellant fails to 
point out that in that case the court was concerned with the 
activities of an associated group which actually did attempt 
to fix retail food and grocery prices, whereas in this case we 
are concerned solely with an enforcement action by the Trade 
Commision of Utah enjoining compliance with the Unfair 
Practices Act of the State of Utah. At no time has either the 
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Trade Commission of Utah or the Retail Grocers' Association 
attempted to fix prices and there is no evidence in the record 
to support appellant's bald assertion in this regard. The action 
of the Trade Commission of Utah in enjoining compliance 
with the provisions of a state statute does not in any way con-
travene the provisions of the Sherman Act. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Unfair Practices Act 
of the State of Utah. is a valid exercise of the police power 
of the State; that the evidence in the record supports the con-
clusion that appellant did violate its provision; and, that the 
cited authorities support the constitutionality of the statute 
so that the decree and injunction issued by the trial court 
should be upheld by this Honorable Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON 
FRANOS C. LUND 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Rlaintiff and Respondent 
CALVIN L. RAMPTON 
SHERMAN P. LLOYD 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs in Interven-
tion and Respondents. 
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